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Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the impact of board gender quotas on the labor market for corporate directors. We find 
that the annual rate of turnover of female directors falls by about a third following the 
introduction of a quota in France in 2011. This decline in turnover is more pronounced for new 
appointments induced by the quota, and for appointments made by firms that regularly hire 
directors who are members of the French business elite. By contrast, the quota has no effect on 
male director turnover. The evidence suggests that, by changing the director search technology 
used by firms, the French quota has improved the stability of director-firm matches.  
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1  Introduction 
 
A well-functioning labor market for corporate directors contributes to the quality of corporate 
governance by helping firms attract and retain the right kind of directors. But since no market is 
perfect, directors and firms may sometimes find themselves matched with the wrong partner. 
Such poor director-firm matches may persist for some time, especially in the presence of search 
and matching frictions.1 But such matches tend to be eventually terminated, either because 
unhappy directors voluntarily step down, or because firms do not reappoint problematic 
directors. By contrast, high-quality matches are stable. Although we typically cannot observe the 
quality of a match, we can measure the stability of a director-firm match by the director turnover 
rate.2 Turnover rates thus allow us to measure how the parties jointly value the match, offering us 
insights into the functioning of the labor market for directors.3 
In this paper, we study the introduction of a mandatory gender balance law in France in 
2011, and its immediate effect on corporate director turnover. Beginning with Norway, many 
European countries have recently passed similar gender quota laws, including Italy, Belgium, 
The Netherlands, Spain, and Germany. Such laws typically require firms to have a minimum 
proportion of each gender on their boards. We see the French case as a laboratory for studying 
the effects of policy interventions on boards’ recruitment and retention policies. The labor 
market for directors in France is particularly interesting because of its reliance on one particular 
network – Grande Ecole graduates – whose members are disproportionally represented on 
                                      
1 Evidence of search and matching frictions in the labor market for directors can be found in Harford (2003), who 
finds that directors take many years to replace their board seats lost in takeovers, and in Denis, Denis, and Walker 
(2015), who show that newly formed boards created due to spinoffs are significantly different from ongoing boards. 
2 Here we follow the theoretical matching literature, which typically defines a stable match as one in which no 
individual or a pair of agents can unilaterally improve upon their situation by disrupting an existing match (see e.g. 
Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). In dynamic settings, an originally stable match may eventually become unstable, either 
because of changes in preferences and agent types, or because of learning. Empirically, the termination of unstable 
matches generates turnover.  
3 The governance literature often interprets the threat of forced turnover as a mechanism for disciplining 
underperforming CEOs and other executives. Here we consider director turnover as a measure of match quality. The 
two approaches are not incompatible with one another; for turnover to measure match quality, we need to control for 
the variation in turnover that is explained by firm performance and other firm-level outcomes. 
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corporate boards. This feature allows us to use the quota experiment to study policy interventions 
in a thin labor market, i.e., a labor market in which most participants come from a relatively 
small pool.  
The introduction of a gender quota is an exogenous shock to the demand for female 
directors. Such a demand shock has opposing effects on the stability of director-firm matches. 
On the one hand, the total surplus generated by a director-firm pair may fall after the quota, 
because firms may hire less-qualified female directors. In addition, female directors may choose 
to leave their firms more frequently, because of improved outside opportunities. Both of these 
effects lead to an increase in female director turnover. On the other hand, the quota may increase 
firms’ costs of replacing female directors. In addition, match quality may improve if the 
introduction of a quota forces firms to abandon selection and hiring practices (or search 
technologies, in the terminology of Diamond and Maskin (1979)) that under-recruit qualified 
women.4 Both of these effects lead to a decrease in female director turnover. The overall effect of 
quotas on director turnover is thus an empirical question. 
Because we focus on director-firm matches, our unit of analysis is a director-firm pair. 
Match surplus and shareholder value are different concepts; the surplus created at the firm-
director level may be captured by the director or by a controlling agent, in the form of a private 
benefit of control. The study of director-firm matches allows us to answer a number of important 
questions: Do quotas affect director turnover? Are such effects different for male and female 
directors? Are such effects different for pre-quota and post-quota directors? How do such effects 
vary across firms? How do quotas affect hiring practices? What does the evidence reveal about 
the labor market for directors?5 
                                      
4 This argument has been used in the literature on affirmative action policies: “Whereas the policy is costly when it 
distorts the selection of the best qualified individual, this need not be the case when the initial selection is 
suboptimal. If the best qualified candidates fail to be selected or fail to apply, then the introduction of affirmative 
action may reduce if not eliminate these costs” (Niederle, Segal, and Vesterlund, 2013, p. 1). 
5 A related question is the effect of the quota on director compensation. French boards are similar to US boards: they 
typically offer the same compensation package to all outside board members. Committee appointments (including 
chair assignments) and attendance thus fully explain observed within-board variation in outside director 
compensation (see Adams and Ferreira, 2008). Controlling for such factors, director compensation has no additional 
information about the value of directors, making an analysis of compensation uninformative for the purposes of this 
paper (we do consider though the effect of the quota on committee appointments). For an analysis of director fees in 
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Our target quantity is the average difference in annual turnover rates between male and 
female directors. We call this quantity the (gender) turnover gap. The turnover gap in France for 
the 2003-2014 period is 4.6%: On average, the male turnover rate is 12.2% and the female 
turnover rate is 7.6%. We show that the introduction of the quota widens the turnover gap, and it 
is indeed the main reason why this gap exists in the first place: The gap increases from virtually 
zero before the introduction of the quota to 3%-5% after the quota. We also find that average 
male director turnover remains unchanged after the quota, implying that we can attribute 
virtually all of this gap to a decrease in female director turnover. The pre-quota female turnover 
rate was 11%; the quota has then reduced this rate by about 27%-45%.  
To estimate the effect of the quota on the turnover gap, we need to isolate such an effect 
from other confounding effects. Our approach is to use residual turnover differences: Male-
female turnover differences that are not explained by any time-varying firm-level variables (such 
as size or performance) or some observable director characteristics (such as age or tenure). We 
are able to perfectly control for any fixed or time-varying firm characteristic by using only within 
firm-year variation in turnover rates across directors. By absorbing performance through firm-
year effects, performance-induced turnover cannot explain variation in residual turnover. This 
approach is possible because we focus on individual director outcomes, and thus our study has 
some methodological advantages over studies that focus on firm-level consequences of quotas.6  
For comparison, we also estimate the turnover gap for US firms during the same period. 
There has been no real discussion of mandatory quotas in the US, unlike in most European 
countries. We find that the US has a much lower gender turnover gap: 1.85%, which is fully 
explained by firm-year fixed effects and director characteristics (in particular age and tenure). 
Thus, in contrast with France, in the US there is no residual turnover gap. We also find that the 
empirical determinants of director turnover in the US are very similar to those in France, which 
validates the use of US directors as a control group. Difference-in-differences estimates, using 
US directors as the control group, confirm that the quota fully explains the residual turnover gap 
in France.  
                                                                                                                       
France, see Reberioux and Roudaut (2016). For an analysis of director compensation by gender in the UK, where 
compensation packages are not standardized, see Gregory-Smith, Main, and O'Reilly (2014). 
6 Our approach is similar to that of Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2016), who use within-board variation to study the voting 
behavior of corporate directors in China. 
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After establishing our main results, we then investigate the mechanisms behind the 
decrease in female turnover. First, we find that post-quota appointments explain most of the 
decrease in turnover: Relative to new male appointments, newly-appointed female directors have 
lower turnover probabilities. The quota thus appears to have improved the stability of new 
matches. Importantly, we find that this fact is not explained by newly-appointed female directors 
being less experienced than female directors appointed before the quota. New appointments after 
the quota fall into two categories: “rookie” directors (i.e., directors without previous experience) 
and experienced directors (those who held board seats before the quota). One possibility is that 
the hiring of rookie directors, who have poor outside options, explains the lower turnover rates. 
However, we find that, if anything, newly-appointed experienced female directors have even 
lower turnover rates than rookie female directors.  
Second, we find that the decrease in female turnover is more pronounced in firms that 
regularly employ directors who are members of the French business elite. We measure the 
degree of board elitism by the proportion of elite Grande Ecole graduates on the board. This is in 
line with Nguyen (2012) and Kramarz and Thesmar (2013), who argue that a Grande Ecole 
degree is a good proxy for membership in elite business networks in France. We find that lower 
turnover of women recently appointed to elitist boards explains virtually all of the effect of the 
quota.  
To interpret the results, we use a simple theoretical framework in which the turnover rate 
is decreasing in the net surplus from a director-firm match. Net surplus is a natural measure of 
match quality. Because high-quality matches are less likely to be dissolved, the (residual) 
turnover rate is an empirical proxy for the (unobservable) net surplus. We use this framework to 
argue that the evidence suggests that changes in the search technology used by elitist firms 
explain the bulk of the quota effect on turnover. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that 
both male and female directors appointed after the quota are less likely to be Grande Ecole 
graduates. This fact suggests that the quota created incentives for firms to change their search 
technologies, from networks to executive search firms, regardless of director gender. We discuss 
some additional anecdotal evidence in line with this interpretation. 
Elitist firms recruit directors mostly through their own social networks. Because women 
are underrepresented in networks of Grande Ecole graduates, a reliance on such a network 
naturally leads to the underrepresentation of women on boards. In principle, the use of such 
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networks may be both rational and efficient: Employers may find it easier to evaluate candidates 
who are similar to themselves (see Cornell and Welch, 1996). However, the use of networks may 
also be a consequence of search frictions (see Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked, 2000).7  
The quota is also a shock to the demand for male directors. Because firms have fewer 
vacancies to offer to male directors after the quota, newly-appointed male directors are likely to 
be better matches with their firms than pre-quota male directors. In addition, male directors may 
have worse outside opportunities after the quota. Both of these effects tend to reduce male 
turnover rates. One the other hand, the quota creates incentives for firms to unseat male directors 
in order to open vacancies for women; this effect should increase male turnover. Thus, from a 
theoretical perspective, the effect of the quota on male director turnover is also ambiguous. 
Empirically, we find that total male director turnover does not seem to change after the quota. In 
the case of newly-appointed male directors, however, turnover rates are slightly lower after the 
quota, which is consistent with the hypothesis that male directors appointed after the quota also 
form better matches with their firms. This effect is economically small (just about one 
percentage point) and statistically imprecise, suggesting that the effect of better matching on 
male turnover is offset by the need to replace male directors with female directors. 
We show a number of additional results. Based on observables – including age, executive 
experience, and education – post-quota female directors seem no less qualified than pre-quota 
female directors. We also find that post-quota female directors are more independent and less 
likely to have family connections to owners than pre-quota female directors. Female director 
“entrenchment” is thus unlikely to explain the fall in turnover rates after the quota. In addition, 
we find that – after the quota – experienced female directors are more likely to leave poorly-
performing firms and firms with more volatile performances, suggesting that improved labor 
market opportunities allow experienced female directors to cherry pick the boards on which they 
sit. 
                                      
7 A related but different explanation for the importance of networks is the hypothesis that elitist firms may have a 
higher propensity to stereotype women as being less competent at board work. Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and 
Shleifer (2016a) provide evidence that people tend to overestimate the performance of men in male-type domains 
(see also Bordalo et al (2016b) for a theory of stereotypes). Under this hypothesis, changes in hiring practices among 
elitist firms are still the main force behind the change in turnover behavior. 
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By considering the effect of the introduction of the quota on director turnover, we hope to 
learn how the market for corporate directors functioned before the quota. As the quota disrupts 
the existing equilibrium, observing how firms and directors react to this shock helps us learn 
something about the old equilibrium. A different question is what the new equilibrium will 
eventually look like. Because the transition period is very long, we cannot answer this question 
with confidence; turnover rates may still change over the years as they adjust to the new 
equilibrium, making it difficult to credibly estimate long-run causal effects.   
The evidence in this paper makes a number of contributions to the academic literature 
and policy debates on the topic. First, our evidence highlights the importance of social networks 
in the market for corporate directors. In their survey of the corporate board literature, when 
discussing directions for future research, Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) ask: “How are 
potential outside directors identified? (…) What is the role of social networks in this process?” 
(p. 99). Our work complements the existing literature on this topic (e.g., Fracassi and Tate, 2012; 
Nguyen, 2012; Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013; Fahlenbrach, Kim, and Low, 2017) by showing 
how networks interact with policy interventions in the market for directors.  
Second, in line with the theoretical arguments in Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked (2000), 
our evidence suggests that search technologies that disproportionately target candidates from 
certain groups may constitute a significant matching friction. The largest improvements in 
female job stability occur precisely in those firms that relied more on the “old boy network” for 
selecting directors. These are the firms more likely to have – perhaps inadvertently – 
discriminated against female directors. 
Third, a natural concern about board quotas is that they may lead to lower standards for 
selecting female directors. In the case of Norway, Bertrand, Black, Jensen, and Lleras-Muney 
(2014) show that this concern has little empirical support; they find that the introduction of the 
quota improved the observable characteristics of female appointees. We reach a similar 
conclusion through a different route: The greater stability of post-quota female appointments 
suggests that the quality of the director selection process has not been compromised by the quota. 
Finally, our results show that female directors may benefit in multiple ways from the 
introduction of quotas. Not only quotas make more board seats available to women, they may 
also increase female director job stability – especially in “elitist” boards – and allow female 
directors to be more selective about the boards on which they sit. Although the gain in the 
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number of board seats for women comes largely at the expense of men, the additional gain in job 
stability does not.  
This paper contributes mainly to a recent literature on the labor market for corporate 
directors, with a focus on director appointments and match formation (see e.g. Akyol and Cohen, 
2013; Denis, Denis, and Walker, 2015, 2017; Matveyev 2016; Fahlenbrach, Kim, and Low, 
2017; Adams, Akyol, and Verwijmeren, 2017; Becher, Walkling, and Wilson, 2017; Cai, 
Nguyen, and Walkling, 2017). Our main contribution to this literature is to show how the market 
for corporate directors functioned before the introduction of the quota, which disrupted the 
existing equilibrium. Our findings suggest that search frictions and networks are important 
features of this market. 
This paper also contributes to a recent literature on board diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Adams and Funk, 2012; Adams and Kirchmaier, 2016; Schmid and Urban, 2016; 
Schwartz-Ziv, 2017; Carter, Franco and Gine, 2017; Bernile, Bhagwat, and Yonkers, 2017; 
Giannetti and Zhao, 2017), in particular to the literature on the consequence of quotas (Nygaard, 
2011; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013; Bøhren and Staubo, 2014, 2015; 
Bertrand, Black, Jensen, and Lleras-Muney, 2014; Eckbo, Nygaard and Thorburn, 2016; 
Reberioux and Roudaut, 2016). More broadly, this paper is related to the literature on male-
female differences in behavior and labor market outcomes for executives and other high-skill 
workers (e.g., Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2010; Huang and Kisgen, 2013). Our paper is also 
related to the vast literature on CEO and director turnover, which focuses mostly on the links 
between performance and turnover.8 Our focus is however quite different; by construction, our 
measure of residual turnover is free from the effect of performance and other firm-level 
variables.  
 
                                      
8 See e.g., Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Weisbach (1988), Denis and Denis (1995), Parrino (1997), Huson, 
Parrino, and Starks (2001), Fee and Hadlock (2004), Yermack (2004), Bushman, Dai, and Wang (2010), Kaplan and 
Minton (2012), Peters and Wagner (2014), Jenter and Kanaan (2015), Cornelli and Karakas (2015), Fahlenbrach, 
Low, and Stulz (2016), Bates, Becher, and Wilson (2016), and Bonini, Deng, Ferrari, and John (2017). 
 
 
9 
2   Institutional Background 
2.1  Board gender quotas 
 
In France, the Zimmermann-Copé law, adopted on January 27, 2011, requires a minimum of 
20% of women on company boards from January 2014 on, rising to 40% on January 1, 2017. 
When a firm has a dual board (a supervisory board and a management board), the law applies 
only to the supervisory board. Within boards, the quota applies to all members—insiders and 
outsiders—with one exception: Directors representing employees, who are usually union 
representatives. 
The law applies to all listed and non-listed companies employing at least 500 employees9 
or with revenues of at least EUR 50 million. The legal forms that are subject to this law are 
limited liability corporations (Sociétés Anonymes), limited partnerships that include at least one 
general partner and a number of limited partners who buy shares in the entity (known as 
“commandite par actions” corporations), and Societas Europaea (the European company 
statutes). All listed companies have to adopt one of these three legal forms. Non-listed 
companies can opt for other legal forms, which are not subject to quotas (SARL, sociétés à 
responsabilité limitée, which have no boards, or SAS, sociétés anonymes simplifiées, in which 
boards are optional). Because we consider only large listed firms, the quota applies to all of 
them. Notice that delisting is not sufficient to avoid the quota. We find no evidence of delisting 
to adopt a different legal form. 
 The law was submitted to the French National Assembly on December 3, 2009, and 
adopted in first reading on January 20, 2010. The parliamentary debates continued throughout 
2010 to January 2011, when the law was formally approved. As many companies have 
anticipated the adoption of the law in 2010, we exclude the 2010 year when comparing the pre-
quota period with the post-quota period. 
 For several years now, European countries have had a number of high-profile policy 
debates about quotas on company boards. Norway was the first country to adopt such a law in 
2003, which was implemented in 2008, requiring a minimum of 40% of board directors from 
each gender. On November 14, 2012, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a 
directive setting a minimum objective of having 40% of the under-represented gender in non-
                                      
9 A new law passed on August 5, 2014, lowering the threshold from 500 to 250 employees from January 1, 2020. 
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executive board-member positions in listed companies in Europe by 2020. This directive is still 
under debate. Meanwhile, several countries adopted regulations requiring greater representation 
of women on boards. The two countries closest to France are Italy and Belgium. Both countries 
adopted a one-third quota law, which are effective from 2015 (Italy) and 2017 (Belgium). Even 
Germany, initially reluctant to consider quotas, adopted in December 2014 a law establishing a 
gender quota of 30%, effective in 2016 for the largest listed companies. 
  
2.2  Boards in France 
 
Under French law, the size of the board may range from three to 18 members. French firms can 
adopt either a unitary board or a dual board, with a supervisory board and a management board. 
The maximum term for a director is six years. The company bylaws determine the duration of 
directors’ terms. The Association of French Companies’ (AFEP-MEDEF) code, adhered to by 
many French firms, calls for a maximum of four years. Renewal is permitted.  
According to the AFEP-MEDEF code, independent directors should account for at least 
half the members of the board in widely-held companies. In closely-held companies, independent 
directors should account for at least a third of the board. After twelve years on the board, 
independent directors lose their independent status. The governance code recommends that the 
outside directors meet periodically without the executive directors. An outside director should 
not hold more than five directorships in listed corporations, including foreign corporations. An 
executive director should not hold more than three directorships in listed corporations, including 
foreign corporations. This limit does not apply to directorships held in subsidiaries and holdings. 
 French law does not cover the number or composition of board committees, which are 
determined by each board. However, French firms typically have three committees: audit, 
nomination, and compensation. 
 
2.3  French business elites 
  
The higher education system in France is divided into two separate blocks: universities and elite 
establishments called “Grandes Ecoles”. In contrast with universities, where entrance after high 
school is guaranteed by law, Grandes Ecoles are highly selective, and their students represent 
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only 5% of the total of those who enroll in higher education each year. In addition to excellent 
high school records, the selection entrance at Grandes Ecoles is based upon an examination that 
requires two years of intensive preparation (Classes Préparatoires aux Grandes Ecoles).  
 In France, the majority of business and governmental elites (administrative, scientific, 
and executive) are former students of the Grandes Ecoles. For instance, around two-thirds of the 
chief executives in France's largest firms graduated from the Grandes Ecoles (for more details, 
see Dudouet and Joly, 2010). 
 Due to historical reasons, those business elites not only benefit from a highly selective 
education, but also from pervasive political and social connections. After World War II, 
numerous former civil servants (from the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Industry) who 
graduated from the Grandes Ecoles began to be hired at top-level management positions by big 
companies (especially state-owned and privatized companies) (for more details, see Bertrand, 
Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar, 2007). 
 A second distinctive feature of Grandes Ecoles is the under-representation of women 
among the student body. According to Albouy and Wanecq (2003), among graduates from 
Grandes Ecoles who were born during the 1949-1958 period, 2432 are male and 546 are female 
(respectively 1829 and 732 among graduates who were born during the 1959-1968 period). Ecole 
Polytechnique (the top engineering Grande Ecole) did not accept female candidates until 1972, 
and had in 2015 less than 20% female students. Moreover, between 1989 and 2009, the 
proportion of female graduates from the Ecole Nationale d’Administration was only around 25-
30% (Larat, 2015). 
 
3   Data 
 
We analyze an unbalanced panel of French and US boards over the period 2003 to 2014 using 
data from Management Diagnostic’s BoardEx database. The sample consists of 3,369 firm-year 
observations for 414 unique French firms, and of 68,170 firm-year observations for 10,490 
unique US firms. All firms are publicly listed. Accounting data are taken from Datastream. If we 
exclude firm-year observations with missing values for firm size (firm operating performance), 
the sample consists of 3,126 (3,086) firm-year observations for France and of 45,222 (42,926) 
firm-year observations for the US. 
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3.1 Firm and board characteristics  
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics of firm characteristics for two subsamples: 
Before and after 2010 (see Appendix A1 for the definition of all variables used in this section). 
Firm size is measured as total assets in millions of Euros, and return on assets is the ratio of 
operating income before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Both 
variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Average size and operating performance are 
very similar before and after 2010, especially in the French sample.  
 Panel B of Table 1 shows board characteristics. Boards are larger and the proportion of 
independent directors (i.e., non-executive directors who are classified as independent by 
BoardEx) is lower in the French sample. The average board size in France is very similar before 
and after 2010. Before 2010, both France and the US had similar proportions of female directors: 
9% and 8%, respectively. After 2010, there is a significant change: France now has 19% of 
female directors, while the US has 9%. This difference is, of course, explained by France 
introducing a quota in January 2011.  
 
3.2  Director characteristics  
 
The sample includes 35,233 director-firm-year observations for France and 521,948 director-
firm-year observations for the US. In our regressions we use only outside (i.e., non-executive) 
directors, thus we also exclude 6,913 director-firm-year observations for France, and 92,357 
director-firm-year observations for the US, where the director is an executive of the firm. 
Finally, we exclude 2,916 director-firm-year observations for France and 8,297 for the US. with 
missing values for age and tenure. The final sample used in the regression models consists of 
21,367 director-firm-year observations for France and 344,552 for the US over the period 2003 
to 2014. 
Table 2 compares outside director characteristics between France and the US by gender. 
In this table, we restrict the sample to outside directors, and include only observations for which 
age and tenure data are available.10 Relative to male directors, female directors are younger and 
                                      
10 Table IA.1, in the Internet Appendix, replicates Table 2 with the unrestricted sample. 
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more independent, both in the US and in France. However, female directors on French boards are 
more likely than their male counterparts to be family members, defined (following Ahern and 
Dittmar, 2012) as directors who share the same last name as another board member.  
 Overall, there is a gender gap in terms of expertise and board experience, which is 
slightly more pronounced in France than in the US. Among French boards, female directors hold 
a lower number of board seats (1.88 seats for female directors versus 2.28 seats for male 
directors, on average), while among US boards the reverse is true (2.91 seats for female directors 
versus 2.17 seats for male directors, on average).  Moreover, in France, female directors are 
much less likely to be member of a major committee (audit, compensation, nomination, or 
governance committees) than in the US. The gender gap in terms of industry expertise is larger 
in France than in the US (8% in France versus 2% in the US).  
In France, female directors are also less likely to be a graduate from a set of nine elite 
Grandes Ecoles.11 The difference is substantial: While 40% of all male directors come for this 
small set of schools, only 23% of female directors hold similar degrees. This is not surprising, 
given that Grandes Ecoles (especially Ecole Nationale d’Administration and most engineering 
schools) include (even until recently) only a small proportion of female graduate students. In our 
sample, the school with the lowest representation of female directors is Ecole Polytechnique, 
with slightly less than 3% of female directors among its graduate-directors.12 By contrast, in the 
US, 28% of all directors hold an Ivy League degree, with no difference between male and female 
directors. 
 
3.3  Turnover rates  
 
To construct turnover rates, we follow the same procedure as in Bates, Becher, and Wilson 
(2016). We follow a director from one firm-year board report date on BoardEx to the next, where 
a report date corresponds to the fiscal year end. Directors who are no longer listed at a 
subsequent report date are classified as turnover directors, while those who remain listed are 
                                      
11 We consider the following schools as elite Grandes Ecoles: Ecole Polytechnique Paris, Corps des Mines, Mines 
Paristech, Centrale Paris, Ecole des Ponts Paristech, Telecom Paristech, Supelec, HEC Paris, and ENA. 
12 Tables IA.2 to IA.8, in the Internet Appendix, show detailed descriptive statistics of director characteristics for 
graduates of each elite Grande Ecole separately. 
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classified as non-turnover directors. We cannot measure director turnover when the firm is no 
longer available in the database the next year. As a result, the sample excludes 4,037 firm-
director-year observations for France, and 76,742 firm-director-year observations for the US, for 
which we cannot identify director turnover. 
The unconditional director turnover rates are on average higher in France than in the US 
and, accordingly, the average director tenure is lower in France (see Table 2). In both the US and 
France, female directors spend less time on boards than their male counterparts: The board 
tenure of female directors is on average 1.74 (1.16) years lower than that of male directors in 
France (US). Female board members are much less likely than male directors to quit boards in 
any given year: Female directors have lower turnover rates than male directors. These 
differences in turnover rates are also much larger in France than in the US (4.6% in France 
versus 1.8% in the US).  
 
4   Descriptive Evidence 
 
Figure 1 shows the speed of adjustment to the new law. While the average proportion of women 
on French boards is 10% in 2009, it rises monotonically to 25% in 2014.  
Firms may adjust to the new requirements in two ways: They may increase the number of 
female directors and/or reduce the number of male directors. By reducing the size of the board 
through the dismissal of some male directors, firms may be able to comply with the law without 
needing to employ many female directors. Figure 2 shows that, on average, firms did not choose 
such a strategy. The average board size in the unbalanced sample appears to decline both before 
and after the quota, but this is mostly a composition effect. In balanced samples, we can see that 
the average board sizes do not change much: For the same set of firms, board sizes in 2014 are 
very similar to their 2007 levels. This figure does suggest, however, that new entrants to the 
sample have smaller boards on average. 
Figure 3 confirms that most of the adjustment occurs through the selection of new 
directors: The proportion of newly-appointed directors who are female jumps from about 13% in 
2009 to 32% in 2010, and continues to rise afterwards, reaching 50% in 2014. This figure clearly 
shows that the quota changed firms’ director selection process very quickly. Since the law only 
passed in January 2011, the significant increase in the proportion of women among new directors 
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in 2010 suggests that some firms anticipated the passing of the law (see the discussion in Section 
2). We see no evidence of anticipation in 2009 or earlier. Figure 3 also shows that, even after the 
quota, most newly-appointed directors are men.  
Since firms chose to appoint so many female directors so quickly, a natural question is 
whether firms have lowered the standards for selecting new female directors. Panel A of Table 3 
shows a comparison of female director characteristics before and after the quota. Perhaps the 
most striking conclusion from this table is that, along a number of relevant dimensions, post-
quota female directors appear to have better attributes on average. Post-quota female directors 
are older, have more CEO and C-suite experience, and are more likely to be assigned to major 
committees, to be industry experts, and not less likely to hold an MBA degree. They have spent 
significantly less time on their boards, which is to be expected, because many of these directors 
have only been appointed because of the quota. Post-quota women are also more independent 
and less likely to be related to the families that control their firms.13 Interestingly, despite having 
better qualifications in most dimensions, post-quota female directors are less likely to be 
graduates from an elite Grande Ecole. Finally, we note that the average female turnover rate falls 
from 11% to 6%. 
Panel B shows a comparison between newly-appointed women before the quota and 
newly-appointed women after the quota. Panel B confirms that post-quota new appointments are 
slightly older and more independent. Post-quota female directors are again less likely to be 
Grande Ecole graduates; the difference is exactly the same as in Panel A, but now it is not 
statistically significant (Panel B has a much smaller sample size). All other observable 
characteristics are, however, very similar. Again, we find significant differences in turnover 
rates: Post-quota new female directors have a 4% turnover rate, which is substantially lower than 
the 9% rate for new appointments before the quota.  
This simple comparison allows us to draw some preliminary conclusions. On the basis of 
observable characteristics, there is no evidence that firms select post-quota female directors who 
are less qualified than pre-quota female directors. There is clear evidence that post-quota female 
directors are more independent, measured either by family ties or by formal director 
independence. This latter finding mirrors the evidence from Norway (see Bøhren and Staubo, 
                                      
13 This is in contrast with the case of Norway, where post-quota women are more likely to be related to the 
controlling family (see Ahern and Dittmar (2012)).   
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2014). Whether independence is good or bad however depends on the context (see e.g., Adams 
and Ferreira, 2007 and 2009). 
In Table IA.9, in the Internet Appendix, we replicate Table 3 for male directors. The 
main finding is that there is little difference in male turnover rates before and after 2010. For all 
male directors, the turnover rates before and after the quota differ only by 0.4 percentage points. 
For newly appointed male directors, turnover falls from 9.2% to 8.1% after the quota, a change 
that is not statistically significant, despite the fact that the male director sample is much larger 
than the female director sample. Table IA.9 also shows an important result: Post-quota male 
directors are also less likely to be Grande Ecole graduates.  
Figures 4 and 5 show the annual average turnover rate for both men and women over our 
sample period. The turnover rate for men looks stable over the years and, consistent with the 
discussion above, does not seem to be much affected by the introduction of the quota. The 
female turnover rate is much more variable, as is to be expected from a much smaller sample, but 
does not appear to differ much from the male rate until 2010. After 2010, we observe a persistent 
gap between these two rates.  
Note that we only observe a turnover gap from 2011. Although there are many quota-
induced female appointments in 2010, turnover for such appointments obviously can only be 
observed in 2011. The fact that we do not see a turnover gap in the years just before the quota – 
2009 and 2010 – strengthens the hypothesis that such a gap is a consequence of the quota. 
 
5  Empirical Strategy 
 
Here we describe our empirical strategy. Let 𝑦𝑑𝑓𝑡 be an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
director 𝑑 leaves firm 𝑓 at the end of fiscal year 𝑡, and zero for all 𝑡′ < 𝑡, and let 𝑤𝑑 take the 
value of 1 if director 𝑑 is female and zero otherwise. We use 𝑦 and 𝑤 to denote the random 
variables associated with these indicators. We define the gender turnover gap as 
 
𝑔 ≡ 𝐸(𝑦|𝑤 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑦|𝑤 = 1).                                                 (1) 
 
In words, the turnover gap is the difference between the average turnover rates of male and 
female directors. We can estimate 𝑔 by a simple regression of 𝑦𝑑𝑓𝑡 on 𝑤𝑑 and a constant.  
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 The existence of a turnover gap may be a consequence of endogenous matching of firms 
and directors. For example, large, mature, better performing, and stable firms may provide more 
job stability, which could be a characteristic favored by female directors. It is likely that 
characteristics that are relevant for matching, such as e.g., firm performance, change over time. 
We thus use firm-year fixed effects 𝛼𝑓𝑡 to eliminate all sources of variation at the firm-year level. 
Such an approach means that our estimates of the residual turnover gap (i.e., after accounting for 
firm-year fixed effects) are free from any time-varying endogenous matching at the firm level, 
including the possibility that directors have a higher probability of turnover after periods of poor 
firm performance. 
 Because we only use within firm-year variation, the turnover gap can only be explained 
by differences between male and female directors, in the same firm, at the same time. Personal 
characteristics, such as age, tenure, and others, could explain part or all of this gap, leaving 
nothing to gender. To account for such possibilities, we include a vector of observable director 
characteristics, 𝒙𝑑𝑡. The residual turnover gap thus reflects characteristics that are not included in 
𝒙𝑑𝑡. 
Finally, we consider the effect of the board quota by introducing an indicator variable 𝑝𝑡, 
which takes the value of 1 for 𝑡 > 2010, and zero for 𝑡 < 2010,14 and interacting it with 𝑤𝑑. We 
thus have the following regression specification: 
 
𝑦𝑑𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑓𝑡 + 𝑎1𝑤𝑑 + 𝑎2𝑤𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑝𝑡 + 𝜷𝒙𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑑𝑓𝑡.                         (2) 
 
Note that 𝑝𝑡 is absorbed by the fixed effects and, therefore, 𝑎3 is not directly recoverable. The 
effect of the quota on the (residual) turnover gap is thus given by: 
 
𝑔𝐵𝐴 ≡ 𝐸(𝑔|𝑝 = 1, 𝛼, 𝒙) − 𝐸(𝑔|𝑝 = 0, 𝛼, 𝒙) = −𝑎2,                                (3) 
 
which can be directly estimated from (2). An estimator for 𝑔𝐵𝐴 is a before-after estimator of the 
average effect of the quota on the turnover gap.15  
                                      
14 2010 is omitted because it is a difficult year to classify. 
15 Because our goal is to estimate partial effects, as in (3), we use linear probability models. An alternative is to use 
binary dependent variable models that allow for fixed effects, such as Logit models. We present estimates using 
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A before-after estimator is all we need if we assume that the gender gap was not trending 
over time. Although Figure 4 shows no clear trend for the difference between male and female 
turnover rates, we cannot rule out the possibility that the turnover gap changes over time 
independently of the introduction of the quota. We thus consider US firms as a control group. 
The advantage of using US firms is that there has been no realistic threat of legal action against 
those US firms that do not promote gender balance on boards. This is unlike the case of most 
leading European economies, where such legal actions have been taken or are being seriously 
discussed. The obvious drawback is that US firms may operate in a very different environment. 
Differences in turnover rates between France and the US may exist because of differences in 
competition, regulation, governance practices, and business cultures, among other reasons.  
To address this latter concern, we estimate turnover regressions as in (2), but without 𝑝𝑡, 
for both France and the US. We find that the empirical determinants of turnover are remarkably 
similar in both countries (Table 4 below shows the results). This finding suggests that 
institutional and environmental differences between US and France have little impact on the 
turnover behavior of corporate directors. This validation exercise increases our confidence that 
the US is a reasonable control group. 
We then run the following regression with data from both France and the US: 
 
𝑦𝑑𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑓𝑡 + 𝑎1𝑤𝑑 + 𝑎2𝑤𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑝𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑤𝑑𝑞𝑓 + 𝑎5𝑤𝑑𝑞𝑓𝑝𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑝𝑡𝑞𝑓 
+𝑎7𝑞𝑓 + 𝜷𝒙𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑑𝑓𝑡,                                                                                         (4) 
 
where 𝑞𝑓 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in France (i.e., the firm is 
“treated”) and zero otherwise. Notice that 𝑎3, 𝑎6 and 𝑎7 are absorbed by the fixed effects.16 The 
difference-in-differences effect of the quota on the (residual) turnover gap is thus given by: 
 
                                                                                                                       
Logit models in the Internet Appendix (Tables IA.10 to IA.16). The estimates for Logit models with fixed effects are 
statistically stronger than those for linear models, and they confirm all the results obtained with linear models. A 
problem with Logit models is that we cannot recover the partial effect in (3) without making assumptions about the 
distribution of the firm-year fixed effects. A similar problem arises with duration models, with the additional 
problem of incidental parameters associated with fixed effects. This explains our preference for linear models. 
16 According to our notation, any variable that doesn’t have a d subscript is absorbed by the firm-year fixed effects. 
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𝑔𝐷𝐷 ≡ 𝑔𝐵𝐴(𝑞 = 1) − 𝑔𝐵𝐴(𝑞 = 0) = −𝑎5.                                          (5) 
 
If the turnover gap has no trends that are unrelated to the quota, then 𝑔𝐵𝐴 = 𝑔𝐷𝐷. Otherwise, 
𝑔𝐷𝐷 is preferred. 
 Our methodology allows us – under the maintained assumptions – to identify the effect of 
the quota on the residual turnover gap. But what can we say about the effect of the quota on 
female turnover levels? If we are willing to assume that the quota had no effect on the turnover 
behavior of men, then 𝑎3 = 0, and 𝑔
𝐵𝐴 is now a difference-in-differences estimator of the 
average effect of the quota on female turnover rates, and 𝑔𝐷𝐷 is a triple-difference estimator of 
this effect. Although we do not make the assumption that 𝑎3 = 0, we note that, empirically, 𝑎3 
indeed appears to be very close to zero. Therefore, in practice it does not make much difference 
which interpretation we follow: Changes in the gender gap are almost identical to changes in 
female turnover rates. 
 
6  Main Empirical Results 
6.1  The effect of the quota on female director turnover 
 
Table 4 shows the outputs of regressions of the turnover variable on the female indicator and 
other controls, for France (Columns 1 to 4) and the US (Columns 5 to 8), for the whole period of 
2003-14. Column 1 shows the estimate of the gender turnover gap in a simple regression without 
any controls or fixed effects. We find that the “raw” turnover gap in France is 4.6%. Then, in 
Column 2, we add firm-year fixed effects. The gap falls by roughly 21%, and is now 3.6%. 
Endogenous matching of firms and directors explain only a small fraction of the gap. In Column 
3, we add a measure of director tenure (number of years on the board) and a fourth-order 
polynomial of age.17 The measured gap is now 2.9%. In Column 4, we add five additional 
director-level covariates: the number of additional directorships, and indicators for (possible) 
family connections, independence, membership in major committees, and industry expertise. The 
number of observations now falls because of some missing data. We see that all director-specific 
variables appear to affect turnover in a statistically precise way, with the exception of industry 
                                      
17 Fourth-order polynomials – or quartics – of age are typically used in labor economics when studying gender 
effects (see e.g., Goldin, 2014). Alternative specifications for tenure and age yield very similar results. 
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expertise, which is only borderline significant. There is an economically and statistically 
significant gender turnover gap of 3.5%. Adding even more director characteristics reduces 
sample size but has little impact on the gender gap (we consider educational variables in Table 
6).  
 Columns 5 to 8 replicate the same exercise for US firms. From Column 5 we see that a 
gender gap also exists in the US, although it is much lower: 1.85%. Note that male turnover is 
also lower in the US than in France, which is compatible with the hypothesis that the US market 
for corporate directors is more developed, and thus more stable.18 Column 6 reveals that, as in 
France, firm-year effects explain only a small portion of the gender gap, which is now 1.56%. 
The most important difference arises in Column 7: After controlling for tenure and age, the 
gender turnover gap all but disappears. The estimated gap of 0.29% is economically irrelevant 
and borderline statistically significant, despite the very large sample. Once the additional 
controls are added, the turnover gap is obliterated: It is now 0.03% with a t-statistic of 0.16. With 
a sample size of more than 300,000 observations, we can safely conclude that there is no residual 
gender tenure gap in the US. 
 Table 4 allows us to draw two important conclusions. First, firm-year effects and director 
characteristics cannot fully explain the gender turnover gap in France. By contrast, firm-year 
effects and director characteristics – in particular age and tenure – explain all of the turnover gap 
in the US, leaving no room for pure gender effects. In the US, male and female turnover rates are 
essentially identical to one another, once other characteristics are controlled for. We conclude 
that there is something specific to French directors, which is not yet captured by the covariates 
included in our empirical model. 
 Second, comparing Columns 4 and 8, we find that, with the above noted exception of the 
gender gap, the empirical determinants of turnover are strikingly similar in both countries. Note 
that not only all coefficients share the same signs, but their magnitudes are very similar too. The 
effects of tenure and age are, in particular, very similar. The shape of the age polynomial is 
remarkably similar, differing only by a level effect. Because constant level effects are 
differenced out in difference-in-differences estimations, the comparison between Columns 4 and 
8 suggests that, at least for the purpose of estimating director turnover, the US is indeed a good 
control group for France. 
                                      
18 See Section 7 for interpretation. 
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 Table 5 displays our main results. In Columns 1 to 4 we run increasingly more saturated 
versions of the model in (2), from no controls to a full set of controls. In Column 1 we see that, 
even without any control variable or firm-year effect, the turnover gap is fully explained by the 
years after the quota. Our before-after estimate of the effect of the quota on the turnover gap is 
5.14%. Note that the coefficient of the post-2010 dummy is economically negligible and 
statistically insignificant. This indicates that the turnover gap is fully explained by a reduction in 
female turnover after the quota; male director turnover does not seem to be affected by the quota. 
Thus, we reach the same conclusions independently of whether we interpret the results as a 
reduction in the gap or as a reduction in female director turnover. Columns 1 to 4 show estimates 
of the gender gap that range between 3% and 5%. In sum, the post 2010 period explains virtually 
all of the residual gender gap reported earlier in Table 4. 
 Columns 5 to 8 show the difference-in-differences estimates as in model (4), using the 
US as a control. We find estimates of the gender turnover gap that are remarkably similar to 
those obtained through before-after estimators, suggesting that there are no trends in the 
differences between female and male turnover rates that confounded the before-after estimates.  
 We have not used educational variables as covariates in the regressions in Tables 4 and 5, 
because missing data reduce the sample size significantly. For robustness, in Table 6 we present 
the results of the full-model regressions when we include an MBA dummy, a Grande Ecole 
dummy (for France), and an Ivy League dummy (for the US) among the set of director 
characteristics. We find that the quota effects appear stronger when educational variables are 
included, with estimated effects in the 4.2%-4.7% range for the full model, in contrast with an 
effect of about 3% in Table 5.19 
 We conclude that the French quota has reduced female director turnover. This effect is 
quite robust and about 3 to 5 percentage points, depending on the specification and the sample. 
 
                                      
19 Tables IA.17 to IA.24, in the Internet Appendix, present additional results after controlling for whether directors 
are foreigners, have CEO experience, and C-Suite experience. The estimates of the effect of the quota are very 
similar. 
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6.2  Why does female director turnover fall? 
 
In this section, we consider additional cuts of the data to investigate some of the reasons why 
female director turnover falls. 
 One possibility is that, after the quota, turnover falls because firms become more 
reluctant to let incumbent female directors go. This would happen if the cost of replacing female 
directors increases after the quota (that is, if the quota worsens the firm’s outside options; see 
Section 7). This hypothesis predicts that the gender gap should increase both for existing 
appointments and for new appointments. 
 Table 7 shows before-after and difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the 
quota on the gender turnover gap, after we restrict the sample to appointments (male and female) 
made before 2010. We see that, in this sample, the effect of the quota is weaker than that in the 
unrestricted sample. The quota effect now ranges between 2.3%-3.2% and fails to be statistically 
significant when all controls are included. These estimates suggest that the quota effect is 
stronger for post-2010 appointments. Table 8 confirms this suggestion. There we see that the 
quota effect for new appointments after 2010 ranges from 3.7% to 5.5%, and this effect appears 
stronger when more controls are included.  
What can we conclude? One may think that the stronger effect for new appointments is a 
somewhat mechanical effect, because new appointments are less likely to be terminated in the 
near future than old appointments. But note that this cannot be the case, because the turnover gap 
compares new female appointments with new male appointments; any mechanical effect should 
also affect new male appointments. In fact, we see from the evidence in Section 3 that turnover 
for new male appointments after the quota is only slightly lower than that for pre-quota new male 
appointments (the difference is not statistically significant). It must then be that female director-
firm matches formed after the quota are more stable than pre-quota matches.  
Another possible explanation for this evidence is as follows. After the quota, firms may 
hire a number of inexperienced female directors, who have poor outside opportunities, and thus 
display low voluntary turnover. For this explanation to be true, we need newly-appointed 
inexperienced directors to display lower turnover rates than newly-appointed experienced 
directors. Table IA.31 (in the Internet Appendix) shows that, if anything, the opposite is true: 
experienced directors appointed after the quota have lower turnover rates than “rookie” directors; 
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the difference is economically but not statistically significant. We conclude that the stronger 
reduction in turnover for new appointments is not explained by rookie directors with few outside 
options; experienced directors with new appointments are at least as likely to display lower 
turnover rates than rookie directors. 
It is possible that, when recruiting directors, some boards rely more on some observable 
director characteristics than others. There is evidence that networks based on common 
educational backgrounds affect the selection of executives and directors in France (Nguyen 
(2012); Kramarz and Thesmar (2013)). Thus, here we investigate the effect of board elitism, 
measured by the proportion of Grande Ecole and Ivy League graduates on the board (we include 
Ivy League graduates to construct a similar variable for US firms). 
 With one more interaction, interpreting the coefficients becomes more difficult, so it is 
important that we define formally which effects we want to estimate. Let 𝑒 be a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the board has a proportion of elite school graduates that is below the sample 
median. We are interested in three quantities (we omit the conditioning variables 𝛼 and 𝒙 to 
simplify notation): 
 
𝑔(𝑒 = 0) ≡ 𝐸(𝑔|𝑝 = 1, 𝑒 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑔|𝑝 = 0, 𝑒 = 0)                              (6) 
𝑔(𝑒 = 1) ≡ 𝐸(𝑔|𝑝 = 1, 𝑒 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑔|𝑝 = 0, 𝑒 = 1) 
∆𝑔(𝑒) ≡ 𝑔(𝑒 = 1) − 𝑔(𝑒 = 0). 
 
In words, 𝑔(𝑒 = 0) is the effect of the quota on the turnover gap for low-elitism boards, 𝑔(𝑒 =
1) is the effect of the quota on the turnover gap for high-elitism boards, and ∆𝑔(𝑒) is the effect 
of the quota on the difference in turnover gaps between high-elitism boards and low-elitism 
boards. 
 Table 9 presents both before-after and difference-in-differences estimates for the effects 
in (6). We find that the quota has an economically strong and statistically precise effect on the 
turnover gap for high-elitism boards: Our estimates all lie in a narrow range between 5.4% and 
6.6%. By contrast, the quota has virtually no effect on the turnover gap for low-elitism boards. 
Finally, the difference between the two effects is about 5 percentage points. 
 As before, we also split the sample into pre 2010 appointments and post 2010 
appointments. Table 10, Panel A, shows that, for pre 2010 positions only, the effect of the quota 
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for high-elitism board is a bit weakened: It ranges from 3.4% to 4.4%, and its significance is 
sometimes marginal. As before, the quota effect on low-elitist boards is small and statistically 
insignificant. Panel B considers post 2010 appointments and shows an even stronger effect of the 
quota on the turnover gap for high-elitism boards: Our estimates now lie between 5.5% and 
7.4%. Again, we see virtually no effect on low-elitism boards. The difference between the two is 
large – between 4.7 and 6.8 percentage points – but fails statistical significance tests, probably 
because of the reduction in sample size (there are only 1,882 new appointments in France after 
2010).  
 There are many firm characteristics that could be related to board elitism. Is board elitism 
just a proxy for other important characteristics that affect turnover? We have investigated some 
of the main candidate variables: We considered sample splits on firm size, industries with high 
versus low number of female employees, the fraction of women on boards pre-2010,20 (partial) 
government ownership, and firm location (Paris versus the rest of the country). The effect of the 
quota on turnover does not seem to vary across these characteristics (results are omitted for 
brevity, but available in the Internet Appendix, Tables I.25 to I.29). 
 In sum, French boards that rely more on educational networks are the ones most affected 
by the quota. Female directors hired by those boards after the quota experience much lower 
turnover rates (relative to men) than before. Again, this effect is particularly strong for new 
appointments. 
 
6.3  Has the quota improved female director job market opportunities? 
 
An additional effect of gender quotas on female director turnover operates through the labor 
market for directors. Board quotas increase the demand for female directors and thus improve 
their job market opportunities. With more opportunities, experienced female directors may 
choose to work only for some of the best companies. Such directors may then voluntarily depart 
from boards that they no longer find attractive. This labor market effect increases voluntary 
turnover. 
                                      
20 Note that splitting the sample by the proportion of women on boards before the quota is exactly equivalent to 
splitting the sample by the “distance” to compliance with the quota. 
 
 
25 
 Figure 6 shows the number of directorships held by directors appointed before 2010, for 
three cohorts of incumbent directors: 2007, 2008, and 2009. While the number of directorships 
held by incumbent men appears fairly stable from 2007 to 2014, the number of directorships held 
by incumbent female directors increases significantly from 2010. For example, female directors 
who are incumbents in 2007 experience an increase in their average number of directorships 
from 1.7 seats in 2007 to 2.6 seats in 2014. While in 2007 this cohort holds significantly fewer 
board seats than its equivalent male cohort, in 2014 the same cohort holds more seats than its 
male counterpart. Finally, notice that earlier cohorts tend to hold more seats throughout the 
sample period than later cohorts, suggesting that experience is a valuable attribute in the market 
for corporate directors. 
 Figure 6 shows clear evidence that the quota has improved the job market opportunities 
of experienced female directors. If the quota significantly improves the market for incumbent 
female directors, such directors may “cherry pick” the boards on which sit: They can now afford 
to leave poor-performing firms because there are additional seats available to them. We then 
have an apparent puzzle: When faced with more opportunities for board appointments, shouldn’t 
female directors display higher turnover rates? Directors cannot hold too many seats, either 
because of regulations21 or simply because they may not have sufficient time available. Directors 
may also choose to depart from boards of poor performing or volatile firms to avoid negative 
reputational effects (see e.g., Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz, 2016).  
Our evidence shows that turnover rates decrease for both new and existing appointments 
(see Tables 7 and 8). This effect is, however, weaker for existing appointments, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that female directors become more likely to engage in cherry-
picking behavior after the quota. To investigate the cherry-picking hypothesis more directly, we 
estimate the effect of the quota on the turnover gaps for low and median/high performing firms. 
We define a low-performance indicator as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ROA 
(return on assets) of firm f in year t is in the lowest quintile relative to other firms in the 
benchmark. We use a set of European firms as the benchmark for France and US firms as the 
benchmark for the US. The use of percentiles of performance is standard in the most recent 
literature on CEO and director turnover (see, e.g., Jenter and Lewellen, 2016; Jenter and Kanaan, 
                                      
21 French regulations recommend that a non-executive director should not hold more than five directorships in listed 
corporations, including foreign corporations, not affiliated with his or her group. 
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2015; Bates, Becher, and Wilson, 2016) and helps substantially when interpreting the results. 
The choice of the lowest quintile as a measure of poor performance is made for convenience; 
different thresholds lead to similar results. 
 Table 11 reports the results in which we interact the poor-performance dummy with the 
quota and the female dummy. In the sample of pre 2010 appointments, we find that the quota 
reduces the turnover gap for low-ROA firms: This effect ranges from 15,3% to 18,4%. The 
difference in the turnover gaps between low-performing and high/median-performing firms 
ranges between 18,6 to 21,6 percentage points and is statistically significant. By contrast, in the 
sample of post 2010 appointments, the quota increases the turnover gap for both low and 
high/median performing firms and the difference between the two groups is never statistically 
significant. 
 In the internet appendix, we replicate the analysis in Table 11, now using the absolute 
value of the change in ROA as a measure of recent volatility. In the sample of pre 2010 
appointments, the gender gap increases for volatile firms and decreases for firms with stable 
profitability. The difference in the turnover gap between volatile and stable firms ranges between 
18.9 to 20.8 percentage points and is statistically significant. Similar to previous results for 
profitability, in the sample of post 2010 appointments, the difference in impact on turnover gap 
between volatile and stable firms is not statistically significant. 
 We conclude that, after the quota, experienced female directors are more likely to depart 
from poor-performing and volatile firms than experienced male directors. This evidence and the 
evidence of a disproportionate increase in board appointments for experienced female directors 
jointly suggest that the quota has allowed these directors to cherry pick the boards on which they 
sit. 
 
7  Interpretation 
 
7.1  The effect of the quota on female turnover rates: Possible explanations  
 
In the Appendix, we provide a simple theoretical framework that is helpful for interpreting the 
evidence. Here we present an informal version of this framework. 
 Define the net surplus from a firm-director pair (𝑓, 𝑑) as 
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𝑄𝑓𝑑 ≡ 𝑆𝑓𝑑 − 𝑉𝑓 − 𝑈𝑑,                                                        (7) 
 
where 𝑆𝑓𝑑 is the gross surplus from the match (or the internal match quality), and 𝑉𝑓 and 𝑈𝑑 are 
the parties’ outside options, for the firm and the director, respectively. We may interpret these 
outside options as what each party expects to receive under an alternative match, minus 
searching and matching costs. Because a match should be continued only when the net surplus is 
sufficiently high, it is natural to interpret 𝑄𝑓𝑑 as a measure of (net) match quality. This implies 
that the probability of turnover is decreasing in match quality (the Appendix formalizes this 
claim). 
 It is important not to confuse match quality with shareholder value; increases in match 
quality can actually reduce firm value, for two reasons. First, note that the unit of analysis is a 
firm-director pair (𝑓, 𝑑), and thus 𝑄𝑓𝑑 measures the joint net surplus from this match, without 
any reference to how this surplus is shared between the parties. An increase in net surplus that is 
accompanied by an increase in directors’ bargaining power can thus reduce shareholder value.  
Second, an important aspect of (7) is that the firm is represented by its controlling agent (i.e., the 
party who effectively controls board appointments), such as the CEO or a controlling 
shareholder. The controlling agent maximizes her objective function, which may include private 
benefits. To give a concrete example, suppose that the quota is used as an excuse to appoint 
some of the controlling agent’s female relatives to the board. This may increase match quality 
from the joint perspective of the controlling agent and the director, but it is certainly bad news 
for the non-controlling shareholders.  
 What is the effect of a board gender quota on match quality? The effect of the quota on 
outside options is unambiguous: Because the quota increases the demand for female directors, if 
director d is female, 𝑉𝑓 decreases and 𝑈𝑑 increases. By contrast, the effect of the quota on the 
gross surplus from the match, 𝑆𝑓𝑑, is ambiguous. Note the quota can only affect 𝑆𝑓𝑑 by 
influencing the formation of new matches. If the quota induces firms to hire less-qualified female 
directors, 𝑆𝑓𝑑 falls after the quota. On the other hand, if the quota induces firms to hire more-
qualified female directors, 𝑆𝑓𝑑 increases after the quota. 
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 How can we apply this framework to make sense of the evidence? First, notice that the 
evidence that female director turnover decreases after the quota suggests an increase in match 
quality. But what is the mechanism through which the quota affects match quality? When trying 
to answer this question, we use the decomposition of match quality into three components, as in 
(7), as a way of organizing the different explanations: 
 
(i) Changes in 𝑉𝑓 
We expect 𝑉𝑓 to fall after the quota, because firms may find it more difficult to replace 
female directors because of more competition. This effect alone could explain the increase in 
match quality.22 We call this explanation the replacement cost hypothesis.  
If an increase in replacement costs was the only reason for the decrease in female 
turnover, we would expect to see similar reductions in turnover for both new and existing 
appointments. If anything, we would expect firms to find harder to replace experienced 
incumbent female directors than newly-appointed female directors. However, we find that the 
effect of the quota on turnover is much stronger for post-quota appointments. This evidence 
cannot be explained by an increase in firm’s replacement costs. As discussed above, this 
evidence also cannot be explained by inexperienced female directors displaying lower turnover 
rates, because if anything the opposite is true, or by mechanical effects, because our tests 
compare newly-appointed women to newly-appointed men. 
The replacement cost hypothesis should also have more bite among firms that are far 
from compliance, that is, firms that have fewer women on their boards. But the effect of the 
quota on turnover is unaffected by proportion of female directors on the board (see Table IA.27 
in Internet Appendix). 
We conclude that, although an increase in replacement costs may still explain part of the 
fall in female turnover, it can neither explain why such a decrease is concentrated among newly-
appointed directors nor explain why the effect does not depend on how far boards are from the 
quota. 
 
                                      
22 Alternatively, it is possible that the quota increases 𝑉𝑓, perhaps because a large number of women now enter the 
director labor market. This is, however, unlikely to happen in the short run. 
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(ii) Changes in 𝑈𝑑 
       Since the quota is likely to increase 𝑈𝑑, which then decreases match quality, one may 
think that we can quickly rule out changes in 𝑈𝑑 as a possible explanation for the decrease in 
female turnover. But there is a subtle way through which changes in 𝑈𝑑 could still help explain 
the evidence: If the quota induces firms to hire new female directors with worse outside 
opportunities, the average 𝑈𝑑 may actually fall. But, as discussed above, we find no evidence 
that such “rookie” directors have lower turnover than experienced directors, casting doubt on 
explanations based on 𝑈𝑑 only (see Table I.31 in the Internet Appendix). 
 
(iii) Changes in 𝑆𝑓𝑑 
 For this mechanism to explain the evidence, we need the quota to increase the (gross) 
surplus generated by the match, 𝑆𝑓𝑑. That is, internal match quality needs to increase.  How is 
this possible?  
 Internal match quality may increase if the quota eliminates frictions in the matching 
process. This could happen if, before the quota, some firms only considered a restricted set of 
qualified women as potential candidates. If the quota forces firms to change their hiring 
practices, firms may now find even better female candidates, thus improving internal match 
quality.  
 The data offer some support for this explanation. First, this explanation is compatible 
with the evidence that the quota effects operate mainly through new appointments. Second, we 
find that, based on observable characteristics, post-quota female appointments are clearly no less 
qualified than pre-quota female directors. If anything, new appointments are older (and thus 
perhaps more experienced) and more independent.  
Third, the quota effects are much stronger for firms that regularly hire directors who are 
members of the French business elite. Firms may find it difficult to identify qualified female 
candidates in a network in which women are underrepresented. This interpretation is in line with 
Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked (2000), who develop a model in which firms search for 
workers, who are either “red” or “green.” Although reds and greens are equally qualified for the 
job, there is an equilibrium in which firms search only for green workers. The authors “interpret 
a strategy of searching only for greens as the cultivation of a contact network that involves 
primarily greens” (p.48). 
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Fourth, if firms indeed adopt new search technologies after the quota, it would be natural 
for them to use these new practices for hiring all types of directors, and not only female 
directors. Tables 3 and IA.9 (in the Internet Appendix) show that new appointments – both male 
and female – are less likely to be Grande Ecole graduates after the introduction of the quota. 
Finally, this explanation is consistent with some existing anecdotal evidence. The 
business media has reported many instances of changes in hiring practices as a consequence of 
the quota. Here are a couple of examples:      
 
"The transformation induced by the Copé-Zimmermann Law had several consequences, amongst 
which more professional recruitment methods. Careful selection of candidates replaced old 
friendly cooptation." (Le Nouvel Economiste, January 2016). 
 
"From 2011, when Hubert Sagnières (CEO of Essilor) received a large amount of unsolicited 
applications and recommendations for joining the board (particularly women), he wished to 
ensure the independence of the hiring decision by using a headhunter." (Source: Les Echos 
Business, March 2016). 
Although the use of search firms is just one aspect of the recruitment process, it is a good 
indicator of the professionalization of this process. After 2010, some executive search firms have 
created separate departments for female directors. For example, Leyders Associates introduced 
“Femmes au Cœur des Conseils,” which has a database of more than one thousand women as 
potential candidates for board positions.23 
 The quota may also have affected the supply side of the director labor market. Before the 
quota, most women knew that opportunities to be on boards were very rare (except for family 
and some very well connected women). After the quota, many more women chose to train to 
become a director. For example, since 2010, the Institut Français des Administrateurs, a non-
profit organization of directors, offers a degree “Le Certificat Administrateur de Sociétés” 
(executive education over 6 months) aimed at people who would like to become a director. Over 
the period 2010-2016, 54% of the participants have been women. 
 
                                      
23 See Akyol and Cohen (2013) for a study of the role of search firms in the appointment of outside directors in the 
US. 
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7.2   Related evidence 
 
Our results relate to the literature on the effect of affirmative action policies on gender 
differences. For example, Niederle, Segal, and Vesterlund (2013) show experimental evidence 
that the introduction of female “quotas” for winners in a competitive tournament increases the 
supply of qualified female participants. They show that this supply effect fully offsets the 
potential negative effect of the quota on the average performance of winners. This happens 
because, without the quota policy, many high-performing women choose not to participate in the 
tournament. 
 Another study that shows evidence of possible frictions in the selection of men versus 
women is Kaplan and Sorensen (2016), who study the characteristics of candidates for top 
executive positions, using a private database of executive assessments. They identify four 
clusters of characteristics that predict the likelihood of becoming CEO. In their sample, there are 
no significant differences between men and women with respect to these observable 
characteristics. Nonetheless, after holding these four clusters of characteristics constant, women 
are still less likely to be hired as CEO than men. 
 
8  Conclusion 
 
We conclude with a discussion of some possible interpretations and consequences of our 
findings.  
There is clear evidence that the introduction of board gender quotas in France has 
decreased the rate of turnover of female directors. One possible explanation for this evidence is 
that firms uniformly became keener to reappoint most female directors at the end of their terms. 
But this story cannot explain why most of the effect of the quota is on newly-appointed female 
directors: Quota-induced matches are much more stable than pre-quota matches. Thus, any 
explanation must account for the differences between pre-quota and post-quota appointments.   
Female directors appointed after the quota do not appear to be less qualified than pre-
quota female directors. Post-quota female appointees are slightly older and more independent 
than pre-quota female directors, which also means that post-quota female directors are less 
connected to shareholders and executives.  
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The effect of the quota on turnover is more pronounced for firms that typically hire from 
the French business elite. This evidence suggests that the quota forced “elitist” firms to look 
beyond their normal pool of candidates. Because women are underrepresented among Grande 
Ecole graduates, we expect these firms to find it difficult to select female directors without 
changing their selection practices. It is thus perhaps not surprising that such firms prefer to hold 
on to their female directors. But note again that difficulties in selecting women cannot explain 
the differential turnover rates among incumbent and newly-appointed female directors. 
One story that can rationalize the results is as follows. It is possible that some firms used 
a search technology that excluded a number of potentially qualified individuals from the pool of 
candidates. This does not mean that firms discriminated against women per se; discrimination 
may happen indirectly and incidentally as a consequence of existing hiring norms. Slow-
changing hiring practices may thus represent a real matching friction. Large, mature, and 
profitable firms, such as those in our sample, may survive or even thrive despite such practices. 
It may also be that hiring through social connections is ultimately beneficial to firms because of 
the connections themselves, even if firms pass up opportunities to hire better qualified 
candidates. 
Once the quota forces firms to change their hiring practices, they start tapping into a 
different pool of talent. The new recruits form more stable matches, perhaps because they are of 
high quality but were previously ignored, or because these new directors value their board 
positions more than those who have been hired through connections. In either case, match quality 
– as measured by the probability of termination – is improved.  
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A1  Variable Definitions  
Firm characteristics (Source: Datastream) 
Firm Size Total assets in Millions of Euros. 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by total 
assets. 
Board characteristics  (Source: BoardEx) 
Board Size The number of board members. 
Proportion of independent 
directors 
The ratio of independent directors on the board. 
Proportion of women on board The ratio of female directors on the board. 
Director Characteristics  (Source: BoardEx) 
Age Director age in years. 
Time on board Director tenure in years. 
Female Indicator equal to one if the director is female, zero otherwise. 
Family 
Indicator equal to one if the director shares his last name with at least one 
other director, zero otherwise. 
Independent Indicator equal to one if the director is independent, zero otherwise. 
Number of directorships Number of current board seats held by the director in quoted firms. 
Major Committee Member 
Indicator equal to one if the director is member of the audit, compensation, 
nomination, strategy, executive or governance committee, zero otherwise. 
Industry Expert 
Indicator equal to one if the sector of the firm where the director is a board 
member is the same of at least one firm in his/her employment history. 
Turnover Dummy 
Indicator equal to one if a director turns over in the year following the fiscal 
year end for each firm-year observation, zero otherwise. 
Post 2010 
Indicator equal to zero if the year of turnover is ≤ 2009, one if the year of 
turnover is ≥ 2011. 
MBA Dummy Indicator equal to one if a director has a MBA degree, zero otherwise. 
Grande Ecole Dummy 
Indicator equal to one if a director has a degree from Ecole Polytechnique 
Paris, Corps des Mines, Mines ParisTech, Centrale Paris, Ecole des Ponts 
ParisTech, Telecom ParisTech, Supelec, HEC Paris or ENA. 
Ivy League Dummy 
Indicator equal to one if a director has a degree from an Ivy League 
University. 
CEO Experience 
Indicator equal to one if the director has or had at least one CEO position in 
his/her employment history. 
C-Suite Experience 
Indicator equal to one if the director has or had at least one c-suite position in 
his/her employment history. 
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A2  Theoretical Framework 
      
This is not a full-fledged theory, but simply a formalization of the argument. 
     At the beginning of each period t, firms select directors to join boards of a fixed size s (a 
strictly positive integer). To simplify the exposition, we consider a single representative firm. 
This firm has a number of vacancies at ≤ s it needs to fill. Vacancies are created because some of 
the incumbent directors leave the firm at the end of each period. The number of new matches, mt 
(i.e., the number of vacancies that are filled), is determined by the matching function 𝑚𝑡 =
𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑎𝑡,  𝑛𝑡}, where nt is the number of director candidates available for the firm to choose. This 
function implies that, provided that at ≤ nt, all vacancies are filled.  
Candidates come from the set Nt ⊂ Nt; nt is the number of elements in Nt, and Nt denotes 
the population of director candidates. We assume that the set Nt is sufficiently large, so that all 
vacancies can be filled, provided that we choose a sufficiently large subset of the population as 
the set of candidates. We also assume (for simplicity only) that all directors in set Nt are 
observationally equivalent from the firm’s perspective, and thus all directors in Nt have the same 
probability of being matched with the firm. In this formulation, matching frictions can only occur 
because the set of candidates Nt excludes some potential candidates in Nt.  
There are many interpretations of the set Nt: It can denote the set of all potential 
candidate in the firm’s network of contacts, the set of candidates suggested by head-hunters, etc. 
For simplicity, we take Nt as exogenously given. In reality, we expect the firm to choose Nt 
through its choice of hiring practices. 
     To avoid complications, we assume that directors can work for two consecutive periods, 
and then retire. That is, a director “born” in year t–1 can work in years t and t+1; firms live 
forever. Directors can only be appointed at the beginning of each period, and director terms last 
for one period. Young directors are either retained from year t to t+1 or terminated at the end of 
year t. Old directors are always terminated at the end of the year, thus there is no retention 
decision in those cases. Because our focus is on endogenous turnover, here we confine our 
analysis to young directors.  
If the firm hires a new director d ∈ Nt, the match between the firm and the director 
produces a joint gross surplus denoted by a random variable Sdt, with cumulative distribution 
function Fdt defined over (0,∞). The realization of this variable, sdt, becomes known to both 
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parties as soon as the director is appointed and, for simplicity only, the joint surplus remains 
constant at t+1: sdt = sdt+1. For simplicity only, we assume that Sdt and Sd′t, d ≠ d′, are independent 
random variables. This assumption implies that the surplus produced by a board member is 
independent of the composition of the board.  
All potential directors in Nt have a binary observable characteristic w ∈ {0,1}, which 
denotes gender, with w = 0 for men and w = 1 for women. For simplicity only, we assume that 
gender is not a productive characteristic: Fdt(s ∣ w = 1) = Fdt(s ∣ w = 0).  
A match formed at time t can only be dissolved at time t+1. If the match is dissolved, the 
parties receive their (expected) outside options vt+1 and udt+1, for the firm and the director, 
respectively. These outside options may be interpreted as what each party expects to receive 
under an alternative match, minus the (possibly deadweight) searching and matching costs. 
     We can now define the net surplus from a match at time t as the following random 
variable: 
Qdt = Sdt – vt – udt. 
At each t, the surplus is split between the firm and the director according to the sharing rule α ∈ 
[0,1], where the firm receives vt + αqdt and the director receives udt + (1–α)qdt. 
The retention decision. Consider a young director d who is hired at time t. Immediately 
after being hired, both parties learn sdt = sdt+1. Assuming efficient bilateral bargaining,24 the 
match is dissolved at the end of t if and only if qdt+1 < 0, i.e. the net surplus is negative. 
     The probability of turnover. Since Qdt+1 is a random variable as of t, we can define the 
probability that a match formed at t is terminated at the end of year as δdt = Prt(Qdt+1 < 0). Let Htw 
denote the set of directors of gender w ∈ {0,1} hired at time t, and Ht ≡ Ht0 ∪ Ht1. The cross-
sectional average probabilities of turnover for all young directors and for young directors of each 
gender are 
𝛿𝑡 ≡ ∑
𝛿𝑑𝑡
𝑎𝑡
𝑑∈𝐻𝑡 
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑡
𝑤 ≡ ∑
𝛿𝑑𝑡
𝑎𝑡
𝑤
𝑑∈𝐻𝑡
𝑤 
, 
where 𝑎𝑡
𝑤 is the number of vacancies allocated to directors of gender w.     
The quota. Suppose that at date t′, an unexpected shock occurs, such as the introduction 
of the quota. We are interested in the effect of the introduction of a quota on 𝛿𝑡
𝑤. In what 
                                      
24 Bargaining costs don’t change the conclusions, as long as the quota does not affect such costs. The quota is likely 
to affect bargaining power, but not the deadweight costs of bargaining. 
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follows, we consider only the expected effect of the quota on female directors, i.e. we make w = 
1. There is a number of combination of effects that could explain why male director turnover 
does not change with the quota; empirically, we are unable to separate between these 
possibilities.   
The quota can affect average female turnover in two ways: It may affect the set of female 
directors who are hired, 𝐻𝑡
1, and/or the individual probabilities of turnover δdt. 
     Consider first the effect on δdt. After the shock (i.e., for periods t ≥ t′), the net surplus is 
given by 
Q′dt = S′dt – v′t – u′dt, 
and the probability of turnover is δ′dt. For a given female director d, we expect u′dt > udt, that is, 
the quota should improve their outside opportunities. As this effect increases 𝛿𝑡
1, we conclude 
changes in outside opportunities for a given female director cannot explain the evidence. 
     Next, for a given firm, we expect v′t < vt, that is, the quota should restrict their outside 
opportunities. This effect decreases  𝛿𝑡
1 and thus can, in principle, explain the observed reduction 
in female turnover rates. But, empirically, we also find that  𝛿𝑡
1 falls significantly more for newly 
appointed directors. Changes in firms’ outside opportunities alone cannot explain why turnover 
falls more for newly appointed directors; if anything, replacing experienced incumbent female 
directors should become even more difficult after the quota. 
Finally, we consider the effect of the quota on the gross surplus for a given match, Sdt. 
Conditional on the firm complying with the quota, there is no reason to expect any immediate 
change in the gross surplus generated by a given director. This conclusion might not hold in the 
long run; perhaps, given time, female directors can invest more in their human capital in 
response to the quota, and firms may also change their “board technology” to adapt to a more 
gender diverse board. But, given the speed and the magnitude of the quota effect on female 
turnover, it seems unlikely that director training and management technology changes explain 
any substantial fraction of the fall in turnover rates. 
We now consider the effect of the quota on 𝐻𝑡
1. Clearly, the quota must have a direct 
effect on the size of this set, which must now increase. Such an increase creates the possibility 
that the directors appointed after the quota are different from those appointed before the quota. 
Our model allows for two such differences: 
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(1) Differences in udt. It could be that some of the new female directors have lower udt, 
which could then explain the fall in turnover. But this is hard to reconcile with the evidence that 
rookie female directors (i.e., directors who enter our sample only after the quota) have similar 
turnover rates as seasoned directors (who are defined as directors are present in our sample 
before the introduction of the quota). 
(2) Differences in Fdt. To explain this case, we first need to introduce a criterion for 
ranking distribution functions. We assume that all Fdt 's can be unambiguously ranked by first-
order stochastic dominance (even when the firm cannot differentiate between them): Fdt is 
(weakly) better than Fd′t if and only if Fdt (s) ≤  Fd′t (s) for all s.  
Now, differences in F can arise because firms may need to choose from a new set Nt′, 
perhaps because the original set Nt is too small. Suppose first that the original set has all the best 
possible female candidates. Thus, if d′∈ Nt′ but d′∉ Nt, then for any d ∈  Nt, Fdt is better than Fd′t. 
This implies that turnover should increase after the quota, which is not what we observe. 
     This leaves us with the possibility that the new set Nt′ has the best possible female 
candidates. Why would that be the case? Perhaps the quota forces firms to change their hiring 
practices, such as relying less on personal connections, and more on professional recruitment 
firms. An expanded, improve set of female director candidates can simultaneously explain the 
three main pieces of the evidence: (i) a decrease in female turnover, (ii) the larger effect of the 
quota on newly-appointed directors, and (iii) the larger effect of the quota on those firms that 
hire mostly through informal networks (in which women are underrepresented).  
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Table 1 – Firm and Board Characteristics 
 
This table details firm and board characteristics across French and U.S. companies with available board data in BoardEx for two subsamples: 
Before and after 2010. The sample period is 2003-2014. All variable definitions are described in the Table A1 “Variable Definition’’. 
  Mean Median Min Max SD N 
Panel A. Firm Characteristics             
France 
      
Before 2010 
      Firm Size (€ millions) 13703.8 1170.8 8.98 712400 55686.9 1626 
Return on assets 0.10 0.10 -0.69 0.61 0.09 1615 
After 2010 
      
Firm Size (€ millions) 14056.7 995.5 3.60 819768  59610.4  1500 
Return on assets 0.08 0.09 -1.03 0.54 0.10 1471 
US 
      
Before 2010 
      
Firm Size (€ millions) 3139.3 401.7 0.01 1589194.8 21472.4 26941 
Return on assets 0.05 0.08 -6 0.56 0.20 25574 
After 2010 
      
Firm Size (€ millions) 4248.3 610 0.01 1803679.5 29474.4 18281 
Return on assets 0.05 0.08 -1.04 0.43 0.18 17352 
Panel B. Board Characteristics             
France 
      
Before 2010 
      
Board Size 10.8 10 2 36 4.50 1730 
Proportion of independent directors 0.31 0.31 0 1 0.23 1730 
Proportion of women on board 0.09 0.07 0 0.75 0.11 1730 
After 2010 
      
Board Size 10.2 10 2 28 4.24 1639 
Proportion of independent directors 0.37 0.38 0 1 0.22 1639 
Proportion of women on board 0.19 0.19 0 0.75 0.12 1639 
US 
      
Before 2010 
      
Board Size 7.92 8 1 65 3.07 36308 
Proportion of independent directors 0.67 0.71 0 1 0.24 36308 
Proportion of women on board 0.08 0 0 1 0.11 36308 
After 2010 
      
Board Size 7.37 7.00 1 58 3.58 31862 
Proportion of independent directors 0.55 0.68 0 1 0.35 31862 
Proportion of women on board 0.09 0 0 1 0.12 31862 
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Table 2 –Director Characteristics 
 
This table details director characteristics in France and the U.S. separated by gender. The sample includes only outsiders (non-executive 
directors), and all observations with missing information for director age and tenure are excluded. The sample period is 2003-2014.  All variable 
definitions are described in the Table A1 “Variable Definition’’. Diff. denotes the difference between coefficients associated with Men and 
Women directors (Men – Women). 
  Mean Median Min Max SD N Women Men Diff. t stat. 
Panel A. France 
          
Age 58.7 60 23 92 10.4 24037 53.6 59.5 5.89 (31.309) 
Time on board 5.99 4.40 0 57.8 5.94 24037 4.50 6.24 1.74 (15.965) 
Family 0.065 0 0 1 0.25 24037 0.11 0.058 -0.050 (-11.049) 
Independent 0.48 0 0 1 0.50 24037 0.51 0.47 -0.040 (-4.306) 
Number of directorships 2.22 2 1 17 1.72 23607 1.88 2.28 0.40 (12.501) 
Major Committee Member 0.67 1 0 1 0.47 22188 0.59 0.68 0.095 (10.638) 
Industry Expert 0.19 0 0 1 0.39 24037 0.12 0.20 0.078 (10.862) 
Turnover dummy 0.12 0 0 1 0.32 21367 0.076 0.12 0.046 (6.984) 
MBA  0.15 0 0 1 0.36 18447 0.14 0.15 0.0070 (0.911) 
Grande Ecole 0.37 0 0 1 0.48 18447 0.23 0.40 0.17 (16.845) 
Ivy League 0.083 0 0 1 0.28 18447 0.052 0.088 0.036 (6.100) 
CEO Experience 0.44 0 0 1 0.50 24037 0.30 0.46 0.16 (18.124) 
C-Suite Experience 0.032 0 0 1 0.17 24037 0.032 0.031 -0.00060 (-0.187) 
Panel B. US 
          
Age 60.7 61 21 103 9.58 401106 57.6 61.1 3.51 (71.837) 
Time on board 7.24 5.30 0 67.8 6.92 401106 6.20 7.36 1.16 (32.550) 
Family 0.021 0 0 1 0.14 401106 0.020 0.021 0.0012 (1.645) 
Independent 0.86 1 0 1 0.35 401106 0.91 0.85 -0.059 (-32.625) 
Number of directorships 2.25 1 1 50 4.60 370766 2.91 2.17 -0.73 (-30.205) 
Major Committee Member 0.88 1 0 1 0.33 380954 0.91 0.87 -0.035 (-20.397) 
Industry Expert 0.22 0 0 1 0.41 401106 0.20 0.22 0.020 (9.331) 
Turnover dummy 0.085 0 0 1 0.28 344552 0.068 0.087 0.018 (11.928) 
MBA  0.34 0 0 1 0.47 347596 0.31 0.34 0.033 (12.958) 
Grande Ecole 0.0016 0 0 1 0.040 347596 0.00032 0.0018 0.0015 (6.678) 
Ivy League 0.28 0 0 1 0.45 347596 0.28 0.28 -0.0015 (-0.596) 
CEO Experience 0.35 0 0 1 0.48 401106 0.24 0.36 0.12 (48.847) 
C-Suite Experience 0.056 0 0 1 0.23 401106 0.080 0.053 -0.027 (-23.248) 
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Table 3 – Female Director Characteristics in France 
 
This table details female director characteristics among French Boards before and after the quota (introduced in 2010). Panel A includes all non-
executive female board members. Panel B includes newly-appointed non-executive female board members. All observations with missing 
information for director age and tenure are excluded. The sample period is 2003-2014. All variable definitions are described in the Table A1 
“Variable Definition’’. Diff. denotes the difference between coefficients associated with the period After 2010 and the period Before 2010 
(Before 2010 – After 2010). 
  Before 2010 After 2010 Diff. t stat. 
Panel A  - All Female Directors 
    Age 53 54 -1 (-1.977) 
Time on board 5.90 3.96 1.94 (9.134) 
Family 0.17 0.08 0.09 (7.680) 
Independent 0.34 0.58 -0.24 (-12.814) 
Number of directorships 1.8 1.9 -0.1 (-1.541) 
Major Committee Member 0.55 0.60 -0.05 (-2.773) 
Industry Expert 0.09 0.13 -0.04 (-3.378) 
Turnover dummy 0.11 0.06 0.05 (4.609) 
MBA 0.12 0.15 -0.03 (-1.675) 
Grande Ecole 0.27 0.21 0.06 (3.250) 
CEO Experience 0.244 0.318 -0.074 (-4.245) 
C-Suite Experience 0.015 0.039 -0.024 (-3.644) 
Panel B  - New Female Directors 
    Age 49 51 -2 (-2.854) 
Time on board 0.54 0.55 -0.01 (-0.590) 
Family 0.05 0.03 0.02 (1.306) 
Independent 0.45 0.60 -0.15 (-3.601) 
Number of directorships 1.8 1.8 0 (0.592) 
Major Committee Member 0.507 0.495 0.012 (0.262) 
Industry Expert 0.13 0.12 0.01 (0.373) 
Turnover dummy 0.09 0.04 0.05 (2.760) 
MBA 0.11 0.15 -0.04 (-1.194) 
Grande Ecole 0.27 0.21 0.06 (1.382) 
CEO Experience 0.281 0.331 -0.050 (-1.238) 
C-Suite Experience 0.018 0.044 -0.026 (-1.570) 
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Table 4 – Director Turnover in France and in the US, 2003-2014 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of the coefficient associated with dummy variables set equal to one if the director is a woman (“Female’’), if the 
director shares the same name of at least one director within the same board (“Family’’), if the director is an independent director 
(“Independent’’), if the director is a member of at least one major committee such as governance, management, compensation, nomination, or 
audit committees (“Major Committee Member’’), the total number of directorships held by the director (“Number of directorships’’), the number 
of years since the director first joined the board  (“Tenure’’), and fourth degree polynomials of director age. Observations are defined at the firm-
year-director level. The sample includes only outsiders (non-executive directors), and all observations with missing information for director age 
and tenure are excluded. The dependent variable is a dummy set equal to one if the director leaves the board at the end of the fiscal year. The 
sample period is from 2003 to 2014. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-stat are reported in brackets. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
                  
Female  -0.0457 -0.0362 -0.0289 -0.0350 -0.0185 -0.0156 -0.0029 -0.0003 
 
[-8.571] [-6.050] [-4.579] [-5.124] [-13.179] [-10.538] [-1.891] [-0.159] 
Family  
  
-0.0896 
   
-0.0434 
 
 
  
[-7.146] 
   
[-9.551] 
Independent 
  
-0.0424 
   
-0.0653 
 
 
  
[-5.675] 
   
[-18.790] 
Number of directorships 
  
-0.0059 
   
-0.0017 
 
 
  
[-3.828] 
   
[-3.630] 
Major Committee Member 
  
-0.0537 
   
-0.0405 
 
 
  
[-8.637] 
   
[-14.764] 
Industry Expert  
  
-0.0114 
   
-0.0013 
 
 
  
[-1.752] 
   
[-0.756] 
Time on Board  
 
0.0018 0.0024 
  
0.0025 0.0019 
 
 
 
[3.289] [4.188] 
  
[21.213] [15.445] 
Age   
 
0.1698 0.1663 
  
0.1654 0.1798 
 
 
 
[4.009] [3.592] 
  
[11.581] [11.454] 
Age2  
 
-0.4602 -0.4486 
  
-0.4652 -0.5026 
 
 
 
[-3.916] [-3.501] 
  
[-12.499] [-12.361] 
Age3  
 
0.0523 0.0508 
  
0.0540 0.0583 
 
 
 
[3.721] [3.322] 
  
[12.786] [12.707] 
Age4  
 
-0.0021 -0.0020 
  
-0.0022 -0.0024 
 
 
 
[-3.423] [-3.047] 
  
[-12.445] [-12.463] 
Constant 0.1219 0.1207 -2.1079 -2.0132 0.0866 0.0863 -1.9618 -2.0770 
 
[30.670] [157.204] [-3.804] [-3.303] [124.182] [556.185] [-9.732] [-9.303] 
 
        
Observations 21,367 21,367 21,367 19,561 344,552 344,552 344,552 314,131 
R-squared 0.0023 0.2199 0.2271 0.2336 0.0004 0.2466 0.2618 0.2484 
Firm-Year FE NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Country France France France France US US US US 
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Table 5 – The Effect of the Quota on Turnover 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of the treatment effects of the quota (“Post 2010’’) on the gender turnover coefficient (“Female’’). Treatment 
effects (“Female X Post 2010’’ and “Female X Post 2010 X Treated’’) are highlighted in boxes. “Additional director controls’’ include dummy 
variables set equal to one if the director shares the same name of at least one director within the same board, if the director is an independent 
director, if the director is a member of at least one major committee (e.g., compensation, nomination, or audit committees), and the total number 
of directorships held by the director. “Tenure’’ is the number of years since the director first joined the board. Observations are defined at the 
firm-year-director level. The sample includes only outsiders (non-executive directors), and all observations with missing information for director 
age and tenure are excluded. The dependent variable is a dummy set equal to one if the director leaves the board at the end of the fiscal year. The 
sample period is from 2003 to 2014. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-stat are reported in brackets.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
        
                  
Female -0.0137 -0.0114 -0.0099 -0.0186 -0.0169 -0.0163 -0.0061 -0.0029 
 
[-1.217] [-0.934] [-0.787] [-1.416] [-8.277] [-7.375] [-2.710] [-1.298] 
Post 2010 0.0036 
   
-0.0066 
   
 
[0.510] 
   
[-4.829] 
   Female X Post 2010 -0.0514 -0.0421 -0.0335 -0.0306 -0.0036 0.0002 0.0053 0.0046 
  [-3.877] [-2.942] [-2.302] [-2.109] [-1.204] [0.047] [1.634] [1.410] 
Treated 
    
0.0312 
   
 
    
[5.473] 
   Female X Treated 
    
0.0032 0.0049 -0.0073 -0.0220 
 
    
[0.282] [0.393] [-0.567] [-1.656] 
Treated X Post 2010 
    
0.0102 
   
 
    
[1.417] 
   Female X Post 2010 X Treated 
    
-0.0479 -0.0423 -0.0353 -0.0303 
 
    
[-3.525] [-2.843] [-2.354] [-2.007] 
Constant 0.1208 0.1213 -1.9973 -1.9387 0.0896 0.0887 -1.9691 -2.1065 
 
[21.467] [143.997] [-3.370] [-3.019] [97.556] [546.958] [-10.099] [-9.689] 
         
Observations 19,360 19,360 19,360 17,680 333,052 333,052 333,052 304,257 
R-squared 0.0033 0.2229 0.2307 0.2367 0.0014 0.2431 0.258 0.248 
Tenure + 4th order poly of age NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Firm-Year FE NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Additional director controls NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Treated Group France France France France France France France France 
Control Group         US US US US 
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Table 6 – Turnover Regressions with Education Controls 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of the treatment effects of the quota (“Post 2010’’) on the gender turnover coefficient (“Female’’) and additional 
education control variables which include dummy variables set equal to one if the director holds a MBA (“MBA’’), if the director graduated from 
a Grande Ecole in France ( “Grande Ecole’’), and if the director graduated from the Ivy League in the U.S. ( “Ivy League’’). Treatment effects 
(“Female X Post 2010’’ and “Female X Post 2010 X Treated’’) are highlighted in boxes. “Additional director controls’’ include dummy variables 
set equal to one if the director shares the same name of at least one director within the same board, if the director is independent director, if the 
director is a member of at least one major committee (e.g., compensation, nomination, or audit committees), and the total number of directorships 
held by the director. “Tenure’’ is the number of years since the director first joined the board. Observations are defined at the firm-year-director 
level. The sample includes only outsiders (non-executive directors), and all observations with missing information for director age and tenure are 
excluded. The dependent variable is a dummy set equal to one if the director leaves the board at the end of the fiscal year. The sample period is 
from 2003 to 2014. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-stat are reported in brackets.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
  
               
Female -0.0366 0.0005 -0.0057 -0.0014 -0.0015 
 [-4.252] [0.321] [-0.320] [-0.594] [-0.636] 
Female X Post 2010 
  
-0.0466 0.0035 0.0036 
 
  
[-2.338] [0.986] [1.029] 
Female X Treated 
    
-0.0113 
 
    
[-0.643] 
Female X Post 2010 X Treated 
    
-0.0421 
 
    
[-2.098] 
MBA  0.0149 0.0027 0.0060 0.0023 0.0025 
 
[1.990] [2.063] [0.741] [1.702] [1.834] 
Grande Ecole -0.0006 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0010 
 
[-0.088] 
 
[0.033] 
 
[0.174] 
Ivy League 
 
0.0029 
 
0.0033 0.0036 
 
 
[2.118] 
 
[2.270] [2.487] 
      
Observations 15,351 272,039 13,860 247,940 261,800 
R-squared 0.254 0.2656 0.258 0.2658 0.2655 
Tenure + 4th order poly of age YES YES YES YES YES 
Additional director controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Treated Group France US France US France 
Control Group         US 
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Table 7 – The Effect of the Quota on Turnover: Pre 2010 Appointments 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of the treatment effects of the quota (“Post 2010’’) on the gender turnover coefficient (“Female’’). The sample 
includes all directors that were appointed before 2010. Only treatment effects on the turnover gap are shown. “Additional director controls’’ 
include dummy variables set equal to one if the director shares the same name of at least one director within the same board, if the director is an 
independent director, if the director is a member of at least one major committee (e.g., compensation, nomination, or audit committees), and the 
total number of directorships held by the director. “Tenure’’ is the number of years since the director first joined the board. Observations are 
defined at the firm-year-director level. The sample includes only outsiders (non-executive directors), and all observations with missing 
information for director age and tenure are excluded. The dependent variable is a dummy set equal to one if the director leaves the board at the 
end of the fiscal year. The sample period is from 2003 to 2014. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-stat are reported in brackets.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
      
              
Female X Post 2010 -0.0323 -0.0264 -0.0234    
 [-2.157] [-1.720] [-1.523]    
Female X Post 2010 X Treated 
   -0.0315 -0.0276 -0.0254 
    [-2.028] [-1.761] [-1.598] 
       
Observations 17,538 17,538 16,096 306,061 306,061 284,549 
R-squared 0.2326 0.2405 0.2467 0.2466 0.2619 0.253 
Tenure + 4th order poly of age NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Additional director controls NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Firm-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Treated Group France France France France France France 
Control Group       US US US 
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Table 8 – The Effect of the Quota on Turnover: Post 2010 Appointments 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of the treatment effects of the quota (“Post 2010’’) on the gender turnover coefficient (“Female’’). The sample 
includes all directors that were appointed after 2010. Only treatment effects on the turnover gap are shown. “Additional director controls’’ 
include dummy variables set equal to one if the director shares the same name of at least one director within the same board, if the director is an 
independent director, if the director is a member of at least one major committee (e.g., compensation, nomination, or audit committees), and the 
total number of directorships held by the director. “Tenure’’ is the number of years since the director first joined the board. Observations are 
defined at the firm-year-director level. The sample includes only outsiders (non-executive directors), and all observations with missing 
information for director age and tenure are excluded. The dependent variable is a dummy set equal to one if the director leaves the board at the 
end of the fiscal year. The sample period is from 2003 to 2014. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-stat are reported in brackets.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
      
              
Female -0.0460 -0.0481 -0.0551    
 [-2.523] [-2.502] [-2.536]    
Female X Treated 
   -0.0373 -0.0405 -0.0440 
    [-1.853] [-1.975] [-2.053] 
       
Observations 1,822 1,822 1,584 26,991 26,991 19,708 
R-squared 0.4954 0.496 0.529 0.5348 0.537 0.5281 
Tenure + 4th order poly of age NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Additional director controls NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Firm-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Treated Group France France France France France France 
Control Group       US US US 
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Table 9 – Turnover in High-Elitism Boards vs Low-Elitism Boards 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of the treatment effects of the quota (“Post 2010’’) on the gender turnover coefficient (“Female’’) for two 
separate groups of boards. Boards in the first group (“high-elitism’’) include a proportion of directors who graduated either from a Grande Ecole 
or from the Ivy League which is above the median. Boards in the second group (“low-elitism’’) include a proportion of directors who graduated 
either from a Grande Ecole or from the Ivy League which is below the median. Only treatment effects on the turnover gap are shown. “Additional 
director controls’’ include dummy variables set equal to one if the director is a graduate either from a Grande Ecole or from the Ivy League, if the 
director shares the same name of at least one director within the same board, if the director is an independent director, if the director is a member 
of at least one major committee (e.g., compensation, nomination, or audit committees), and the total number of directorships held by the director. 
“Tenure’’ is the number of years since the director first joined the board. Observations are defined at the firm-year-director level. The sample 
includes only outsiders (non-executive directors), and all observations with missing information for director age and tenure are excluded. The 
dependent variable is a dummy set equal to one if the director leaves the board at the end of the fiscal year. The sample period is from 2003 to 
2014. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-stat are reported in brackets.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Quota effect on high-elitism boards 
(𝑔(𝑒 = 1)) -0.0629 -0.0538 -0.0535 -0.0664 -0.0584 -0.0555 
 [-3.171] [-2.669] [-2.729] [-3.221] [-2.799] [-2.714] 
Quota effect on low-elitism boards 
(𝑔(𝑒 = 0)) -0.0123 -0.0042 0.0042 -0.0083 -0.0027 0.0067 
 [-0.615] [-0.208] [0.205] [-0.398] [-0.128] [0.313] 
Difference (𝑔(𝑒 = 1) − 𝑔(𝑒 = 0)) -0.0506 -0.0496 -0.0577 -0.0581 -0.0558 -0.0621 
 [-1.801] [-1.760] [-2.027] [-1.985] [-1.905] [-2.101] 
       
Observations 19,360 19,360 17,680 333,052 333,052 304,257 
R-squared 0.2308 0.2309 0.2369 0.258 0.258 0.248 
Tenure + 4th order poly of age NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Additional director controls NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Firm-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Treated Group France France France France France France 
Control Group       US US US 
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Table 10 – Turnover in High-Elitism Boards vs Low-Elitism Boards:  
Pre 2010 Appointments and Post 2010 Appointments 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of the treatment effects of the quota (“Post 2010’’) on the gender turnover coefficient (“Female’’) for “high-
elitism’’ boards and “low-elitism’’ boards as described in Table 9. Panel A includes all directors that were appointed before 2010, and Panel B 
includes all directors that were appointed after 2010. Only treatment effects on the turnover gap are shown. “Additional director controls’’ 
include dummy variables set equal to one if the director is a graduate either from a Grande Ecole or from the Ivy League, if the director shares the 
same name of at least one director within the same board, if the director is an independent director, if the director is a member of at least one 
major committee (e.g., compensation, nomination, or audit committees), and the total number of directorships held by the director. “Tenure’’ is 
the number of years since the director first joined the board. Observations are defined at the firm-year-director level. The sample includes only 
outsiders (non-executive directors), and all observations with missing information for director age and tenure are excluded. The dependent 
variable is a dummy set equal to one if the director leaves the board at the end of the fiscal year. The sample period is from 2003 to 2014. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-stat are reported in brackets.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Pre 2010 appointments 
      
       
Quota effect on high-elitism boards 
(𝑔(𝑒 = 1)) 
-0.0414 -0.0342 -0.0347 -0.0441 -0.0396 -0.0399 
 
[-1.999] [-1.616] [-1.651] [-2.052] [-1.819] [-1.843] 
Quota effect on low-elitism boards 
(𝑔(𝑒 = 0)) 
-0.0213 -0.0169 -0.0079 -0.0161 -0.0134 -0.0064 
 
[-0.987] [-0.780] [-0.357] [-0.719] [-0.601] [-0.280] 
Difference (𝑔(𝑒 = 1) − 𝑔(𝑒 = 0)) -0.0201 -0.0173 -0.0269 -0.0280 -0.0262 -0.0335 
 [-0.666] [-0.572] [-0.873] [-0.894] [-0.839] [-1.058] 
       
Observations 17,538 17,538 16,096 306,061 306,061 284,549 
R-squared 0.2405 0.2406 0.2468 0.2619 0.2619 0.253 
       
Panel B: Post 2010 appointments       
       
Quota effect on high-elitism boards 
(𝑔(𝑒 = 1)) -0.0663 -0.0695 -0.0738 -0.0550 -0.0604 -0.0678 
 [-2.776] [-2.810] [-2.829] [-2.085] [-2.257] [-2.490] 
Quota effect on low-elitism boards 
(𝑔(𝑒 = 0)) -0.0125 -0.0131 -0.0105 -0.0073 -0.0072 -0.0001 
 [-0.451] [-0.453] [-0.321] [-0.237] [-0.231] [-0.004] 
Difference (𝑔(𝑒 = 1) − 𝑔(𝑒 = 0)) -0.0539 -0.0565 -0.0633 -0.0477 -0.0532 -0.0677 
 [-1.463] [-1.500] [-1.615] [-1.170] [-1.287] [-1.583] 
       
Observations 1,822 1,822 1,584 26,991 26,991 19,708 
R-squared 0.4976 0.4983 0.5323 0.5371 0.5371 0.5283 
       
Tenure + 4th order poly of age NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Additional director controls NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Firm-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Treated Group France France France France France France 
Control Group 
   
US US US 
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Table 11 – Turnover and Firm Performance 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of the treatment effects of the quota (“Post 2010’’) on the gender turnover coefficient (“Female’’) for two 
separate groups of firms. Firms in the first group (“low-ROA firms’’) belong to the bottom quintile of operating performances observed on a 
given year in a given region (Europe for French firms, and the U.S. for U.S. firms). Firms in the second group (“high-ROA firms’’) belong to the 
second to fifth quintiles of operating performances observed on a given year in a given region. Operating performance is the ratio of operating 
income before interest, taxes, and depreciation to the firm total assets. Panel A includes all directors appointed before 2010, and Panel B includes 
all directors appointed after 2010. Only treatment effects on the turnover gap are shown. “Additional director controls’’ include dummy variables 
set equal to one if the director shares the same name of at least one director within the same board, if the director is an independent director, if the 
director is a member of at least one major committee (e.g., compensation, nomination, or audit committees), and the total number of directorships 
held by the director. “Tenure’’ is the number of years since the director first joined the board. Observations are defined at the firm-year-director 
level. The sample includes only outsiders (non-executive directors), and all observations with missing information for director age and tenure are 
excluded. The dependent variable is a dummy set equal to one if the director leaves the board at the end of the fiscal year. The sample period is 
from 2003 to 2014. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and t-stat are reported in brackets.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Pre 2010 appointments 
      
       
Quota effect on low-ROA firms  0.1527 0.1556 0.1733 0.1743 0.1643 0.1839 
 
[2.251] [2.378] [2.982] [2.509] [2.457] [3.077] 
Quota effect on high/median-ROA 
firms 
-0.0372 -0.0307 -0.0309 -0.0343 -0.0290 -0.0319 
 
[-2.213] [-1.807] [-1.813] [-1.967] [-1.652] [-1.805] 
Difference (low minus high) 0.1899 0.1863 0.2042 0.2086 0.1932 0.2158 
 [2.673] [2.708] [3.307] [2.867] [2.752] [3.398] 
       
Observations 14,353 14,353 13,213 218,438 218,438 216,374 
R-squared 0.007 0.239 0.2427 0.0174 0.2331 0.2412 
       
Panel B: Post 2010 appointments       
       
Quota effect on low-ROA firms  -0.0767 -0.0827 -0.0994 -0.0443 -0.0506 -0.0518 
 [-1.344] [-1.423] [-2.075] [-0.721] [-0.789] [-1.002] 
Quota effect on high/median-ROA 
firms 
-0.0430 -0.0467 -0.0453 -0.0370 -0.0422 -0.0392 
 [-1.952] [-1.998] [-1.818] [-1.549] [-1.734] [-1.583] 
Difference (low minus high) -0.0338 -0.0361 -0.0541 -0.0073 -0.0083 -0.0126 
 [-0.543] [-0.580] [-1.018] [-0.110] [-0.121] [-0.216] 
       
Observations 1,377 1,377 1,303 15,982 15,982 15,422 
R-squared 0.0196 0.5237 0.5328 0.0163 0.4961 0.5092 
       
Tenure + 4th order poly of age NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Additional director controls NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Firm-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Treated Group France France France France France France 
Control Group       US US US 
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Figure 1 – Percentage of female directors on French boards. This figure reports 
the average proportion of women on boards each year over the 2003-2014 period. The sample 
consists of 414 French firms from BoardEx. The vertical line marks the year of the 
implementation of the law. 
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Figure 2 – Average board size in France. This figure reports the average number of 
directors (outsiders and executives) on boards each year over the 2003-2014 period. The solid 
line represents the unbalanced sample, while the dashed lines represent balanced samples from 
2003, 2004 and 2005. The vertical line marks the year of the implementation of the law. 
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Figure 3 – Percentage of new female positions over total new positions in 
France. This figure reports the proportion of newly-appointed female directors over all newly-
appointed directors. We estimate this proportion as the ratio of the average probability to get a 
new position for a female director times the number of new female positions, over the average 
probability to get a new position for a male or female director times the number of new positions 
for male or female directors. The sample includes only non-executive directors over the 2003-
2014 period. The vertical line marks the year of the implementation of the law. 
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Figure 4 – Average turnover rate by gender in France before 2010. This figure 
represents the annual turnover rate in France each year, separated by gender. The solid line 
represents the turnover rate for female directors, while the dashed line represents the turnover 
rate for male directors. Turnover is defined as an indicator equal to one if a director leaves the 
board at the end of the fiscal year. The sample includes only non-executive directors over the 
2003-2010 period.   
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Figure 5 – Average turnover rate by gender in France after 2010. This figure 
represents the annual turnover rate in France each year, separated by gender. The solid line 
represents the turnover rate for female directors, while the dashed line represents the turnover 
rate for male directors. Turnover is defined as an indicator equal to one if a director leaves the 
board at the end of the fiscal year. The sample includes only non-executive directors over the 
2010-2014 period.  
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Figure 6 – Number of directorships in France by Gender. This figure shows the 
number of directorships held by both female and male directors for three cohorts of incumbent 
directors: 2007 (solid lines), 2008 (long-dashed lines), and 2009 (short-dashed lines). The sample 
includes only non-executive directors over the 2003-2014 period. The vertical line marks the 
year of the implementation of the law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
